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Abstract
This paper analyzes the economic and political determinants of agricultural protection in
industrial countries during the period 1986-2004. Panel data regression analysis is conducted
for the producer nominal assistance coefficient. The analysis reveals that the agricultural
protection level is negatively associated with the agriculture¡¯s share in the total economy
and the GDP per capita in agriculture. The analysis also reveals that agricultural protection
levels increase when market conditions are unfavorable to agriculture, and in countries with a
comparative disadvantage in agriculture. The post-UR dummy variables suggest that the
Uruguay Round agreements on agriculture have not decreased international agricultural
protection levels. The dummy variables for each ally in the WTO agricultural negotiations
reveal that each ally has unique features and different levels of agricultural protection due to
agricultural efficiency and a stance on multifunctionality of agriculture.
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1. Introduction   
Agricultural protection remains high in industrial countries which have 
reached an advanced stage of economic development, while many developing 
countries have liberalized their agricultural sectors. It is said that agricultural 
protection creates negative externality to developing countries because 
agricultural protection distorts trade of the agricultural products that developing 
countries have a natural comparative advantage in producing.   
Reasons for agricultural protection in industrial countries remain a puzzle for 
most economists because many studies show that the costs of protecting the 
agricultural sector outweigh the benefits to these countries (Blake et al.1999; Diao 
et al. 1999; Diao et al. 2002; CBO 2006). As an effort to liberalize agricultural 
trade, agricultural agreements were adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade talks. It is an open question whether the agricultural 
agreements have achieved the intended goals of substantial cuts in levels of 
agricultural protection in industrial countries having sophisticated measures of 
agricultural protection. There are several coalitions in the WTO agricultural 
negotiations. Each coalition has different positions on the agricultural negotiations. 
It is also an important question whether each coalition in the WTO agricultural 
negotiations possesses unique features of agricultural protection. 
The paper focuses on agricultural protection of 23 industrial countries 
characterized by high per capita incomes and low shares of the agricultural sector 
in the total economy. Panel data regression is conducted for producer nominal 
assistance coefficients from OECD database to analyze economic and political 
determinants of agricultural protection during the period 1986-2004 and clarify 
whether the Uruguay Round agreements on agriculture have achieved the 
intended goals of substantial cuts in levels of agricultural protection in the 
industrial countries together with each ally’s unique features of agricultural 
protection  in  the  WTO  agricultural  negotiations.      
 
2. Econometric Model and Methodology 
2.1. The Model 
The basic multivariate model, which is outlined in Honma and Hayami 
(1986), with the necessary modification to incorporate the producer nominal 
assistance coefficient (NACp)
1  Fis  
 
lnNACpit=α+β1lnAsit+β2lnGpit+β3lnTrit+β4lnCait+εit                    ( l )  
                                                 
1  In algebraic form: NACp = (Pw･Y+PSE)/Pw･Y＝1＋(PSE/Pw･Y). 
where Pw denotes world market prices of agricultural products; Y denotes agricultural production; 
PSE denotes producer support estimate. 
The PSE (Producer support estimate) is an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers in order to support agricultural producers, measured at the 
farm gate level, arising from policy measures that maintain market price supports and provide 
budgetary payments to farmers. Therefore, PSE/(Paw･Y) denotes rate of increase in agricultural 
producers’ income by agricultural protection policies. If there is no agricultural protection at all, 
NACp is equal to one.       2
where the subscripts refer to country i and time t; NACp denotes the producer 
nominal assistance coefficient of OECD; As denotes agriculture’s share in the total 
economy; Gp denotes GDP per capita in agriculture; Tr denotes international terms 
of trade; Ca denotes agricultural comparative advantage. 
Two alternative variables are used to represent a relative share of agriculture 
in a national economy. One is agriculture’s share in labor force (Ls) and the other 
one is agriculture’s share in GDP (Ga). After adding the post-Uruguay Round 
dummy variable, the equation can be written as 
 
lnNACpit=α+β1lnLsit+β2lnGpit+β3lnTrit+β4lnCait+γ1URDUMM+εi t               (2) 
 
lnNACpit=α+β1lnGait+β2lnGpit+β3lnTrit+β4lnCait+γ1URDUMM+εit                (3) 
 
    The data set comprises 23 countriesFF
2
FF over the period from 1986 to 2004: in all 
there are 437 observations. Data sources and definitions together with descriptive 
statistics of the explanatory variables described above are reported in Appendix.   
 
2.2. The Methodology 
The ordinary least square method (OLS) is basically used for the parameters 
estimation. However, there are three possible econometric problems with the OLS 
method, which are briefly discussed and dealt with in this subsection.   
In the OLS regression model, the emphasis is on estimating the average value 
of the dependent variable conditional upon the fixed values of explanatory 
variables. The cause-and-effect relationship, if any, in the model therefore runs 
from the explanatory variables to the dependent variable. However, some 
explanatory variables such as the agriculture’s share in labor force (Ls), the 
agricultural comparative advantage (Ca), the agriculture’s share in GDP (Ga) and 
the GDP per capita in agriculture (Gp) are very likely to be determined by the 
dependent variable, the producer nominal assistance coefficient (NACp).  
To develop a statistical test of exogeneity, the Hausman test is utilized. The 
results of Hausman tests with respect to the producer nominal assistance 
coefficient (NACp) are reported in Table 1, which shows the computed Chi 
squares establishing the endogeneity of GDP per capita in agriculture (Gp), 
agriculture’s share in labor force (Ls),  agriculture’s share in GDP (Ga), and 
agricultural comparative advantage (Ca).  
[Table 1] 
As a result, one year lagged variables of Gp, Ls, Ca and NACp together with 
the other right-hand side variables of equation 2 are included in the instrumental 
variables. Similarly, one year lagged variables of Gp, Ca and NACp together with 
the other right-hand side variables of equation 3 are included in the instrumental 
variables. The indexes of arable land per agricultural employment  (Al) and 
                                                 
2  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States 
   3
agricultural machinery (Am) are considered as proxy variables of land and capital 
to measure agricultural efficiency. These two variables are also included in the 
instrumental variables in each equation when the method of two-stage least-square 
(2SLS) is applied. 
Another possible econometric problem derives from the cross-sectional 
time-series nature of the data. The OLS method assumes that the error terms, εit, 
are independent and identically distributed. However, the assumption is open to 
question for pooled data, which may exhibit correlation of the error term over 
time for a given country, as well as cross-section specific heteroskedasticity at a 
given point of time. In this regard, the regressions are re-conducted using 
generalized least squares (GLS) that gives consistent estimates of the covariance 
matrix in the presence of heteroskedasticity and both contemporaneous and serial 
correlation. 
The other possible econometric problem is whether the results are affected by 
individual effects due to cross-sectional nature of the data. The only way to take 
into account the individuality of each country or each cross-sectional unit is to let 
the intercept vary for each country, which is known as the fixed effects model. 
However, it is not possible to use the fixed effects model using country-specific 
dummies because a NACp for each country in the EU is not available from 
OECDFF
3
FF. Instead of country-specific dummy variables, ally-specific dummy 
variables in the WTO agricultural negotiations are used, which can be the rough 
test to check whether individual effects affect the results to any degree. 
Furthermore, it is also expected to be clarified whether each ally in the WTO 
agricultural negotiations has unique features of agricultural protection by the fixed 
effect model. The United States is specified as the comparison ally. After the 
ally-specific dummy variables in the WTO agricultural negotiations are added to 
the equations 2 and 3, the two equations respectively become   
 
lnNACpit=α+β1lnLsit+β2lnGpit+β3lnTrit+β4lnCait+γ1URDUMM+γ2EUDUMM+γ3
G10DUMM+γ4CAIRNSDUMM+εit                (4) 
 
lnNACpit=α+β1lnGait+β2lnGpit+β3lnTrit+β4lnCait+γ1URDUMM+γ2EUDUMM+γ3
G10DUMM+γ4CAIRNSDUMM+εit                (5) 
  
where EUDUMM, G10DUMM and CAIRNSDUMM are dummies representing 
the EU, the Group10FF
4
FF and the Cairns groupFF
5
FF in the WTO agricultural negotiations 
                                                 
3  OECD does not offer a NACp for each country in the EU. A country in the EU takes the same 
values of NACp as those of the EU for each year.   
4  The Group 10 includes ten countries identified by the WTO which are vulnerable to imports 
due to ongoing reform in the agricultural sector. The Group 10 consists of Switzerland, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Liechtenstein, Israel, Bulgaria, Norway, Iceland, and Mauritius. 
5  The Cairns Group is a coalition of 19 exporting countries, which are Argentina, Australia, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa, Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The 
Cairns Group has been influential in the agricultural negotiations since its formation in 1986. The 
group has continued to play a key role in pressing WTO members to meet the far-reaching   4
respectively. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The empirical results of determinants of producer nominal assistance 
coefficient estimated by OLS, GLS and 2SLS methods together with the fixed 




First of all, the agriculture’s share in labor force is negatively associated with 
the producer nominal assistance coefficient and statistically significant in every 
regression. The negative coefficients of the agriculture’s share in labor force are in 
line with previous empirical studies (Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper 2001). Likewise, 
the agriculture’s share in GDP is also negatively related to producer nominal 
assistance coefficient in every regression and statistically significant in four 
regressions. The results are worth noticing. The negative effect of the agriculture’s 
share in GDP on agricultural protection is inconsistent with the results of most 
previous empirical studies (Honma and Hayami 1986; Swinnen et al.1998; 
Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper 2001; Thies and Porche 2007) except for Olper (1998) 
and Beghin and Kherallah (1994)FF
6 The negative coefficient of the agriculture’s 
share in GDP suggests that the negative impact of income redistribution effect on 
the level of agricultural protection is stronger than the positive impact of the size 
of the vested interest on it in industrial countries. As a result, it can be said that 
levels of agricultural protection decline when agriculture’s share in terms of both 
GDP and total employment increases, whereas levels of agricultural protection 
rises when agriculture’s share decreases in industrial countries. Thus, the results 
support the so-called paradox of number suggested by Olson (1986). The decline 
in a share of agriculture in national income and employment thus made it less 
burdensome for the industrial sector to shoulder the cost of supporting domestic 
agricultural producers. In industrial countries, the agricultural sector is small 
enough to facilitate political cohesion for agricultural protection policy. That is, 
the agricultural sector can put political pressure efficiently on the politician or the 
government for agricultural protection policy. For this reason both coefficients of 
                                                                                                                                      
mandate set in the Doha Development Agenda. 
6 Honma and Hayami (1986) find positive signs on the agriculture’s share both in total 
employment and GDP. Beghin and Kherallah (1994) use the share of agriculture only in GDP and 
find that it is positively associated with the PSE and negatively with the NPC(nominal protection 
coefficient). They cast some doubt on the ability of this variable to capture the Olsonian story on 
decreasing free riding and political resistance associated with economic development and 
industrialization. Swinnen et al.(2000) and Olper (2001) find that the negative effect of 
agriculture’s share in labor force on agricultural protection which shows Olsonian logic and the 
positive effect of agriculture’s share in GDP on agricultural protection which shows the so-called 
development paradox. Swinnen et al. (2001) find the positive effect of agriculture’s share in GDP. 
Thies and Porche (2007) find no consistent effects of the share of agriculture in both GDP and 
labor force on agricultural protection. However, Olper (1998) analyzes determinants of agricultural 
protection in the EU and finds that negative sings on the agriculture’s share both in total 
employment and GDP.   5
the agriculture’s share in labor force and GDP show the negative signs. It is 
consistent with the hypothesis that decline of agriculture strengthens political 
power in the agricultural sector.   
Secondly, the international terms of trade are negatively related to the 
producer nominal assistance coefficient and statistically significant in the six 
regressions. The negative effect of international terms of trade on agricultural 
protection is the same as other previous empirical studies (Honma and Hayami 
1986; Olper 2001; Thies and Porche 2007)FF
7
FF. The results imply that levels of 
agricultural protection decrease in case relative prices of agricultural products in 
terms of industrial products rise. It is consistent with the hypothesis that levels of 
agricultural protection should be raised when world market prices of agricultural 
products rise in order to keep domestic prices of agricultural products high 
enough.  
Thirdly, the GDP per capita in agriculture is negatively associated with the 
producer nominal assistance coefficient and statistically significant in every 
regression. It implies that levels of agricultural protection decrease in case 
agricultural GDP per agricultural population increases. As economic growth by 
industrialization advances, income of the industrial sector exceeds income of the 
agricultural sector. As income gaps between the agricultural sector and the 
industrial sector widens, resistance to agricultural protection from the industrial 
sector becomes less strong. That is, political costs of agricultural protection policy 
decline for the politician, with the result that it becomes a favorable political 
environment for the policymaker to strengthen agricultural protection so as to fill 
up the widened income gaps. From the results of both the GDP per capita in 
agriculture and the agriculture’s share in the total economy, it can be said that 
agricultural protection is interaction between the politician and the consumer of 
the industrial sector or the farmer in a political market.   
Fourthly, the agricultural comparative advantage is negatively associated with 
the producer nominal assistance coefficient in every regression and statistically 
significant in five regressions. The negative signs of the agricultural comparative 
advantage are in line with previous empirical studies (Honma and Hayami 1986; 
Beghin and Kherallah 1994; Olper 2001; Thies and Porche 2007). The results 
support the hypothesis that levels of agricultural protection should be raised in 
order to reduce income differentials between the agricultural sector and the 
industrial sector if a degree of an agricultural comparative disadvantage is high.   
Fifthly, the coefficients of the post-UR dummy variables show inconsistent 
signs in general and even the positive signs in four regressions statistically 
significant. The results are different from those of Thies and Porche (2007). Thies 
and Porche (2007) use the average producer nominal protection coefficient 
(APNPC) as the dependent variableFF
8
FF. It is arguable that the ANNPC is able to 
                                                 
7 Beghin and Kherallah (1994) find the international terms of trade had no significant impact on 
agricultural protection. 
8 The APNPC is the average producer nominal protection coefficient across all available 
commodity categories. The producer nominal protection coefficient (NPCp) measures the ratio 
between the average price received by producers (at the farm gate), including payments based on 
output (PO/tonne), and the border price (at the farm gate). In algebraic form   6
capture the sophisticated measures of agricultural protection in industrial 
countries, especially agricultural exporting countries. In this study, NACp, a better 
measurement than the ANNPC, is adopted. The result suggests that the Uruguay 
Round agreements on agriculture have not achieved the intended goals of 
substantial cuts in levels of agricultural protection in spite of the successful 
inclusion of agricultural products in the international multilateral negotiations FF
9
FF. 
Finally, the ally-specific dummy variables are considered. The coefficients of 
the dummy variables for the Group 10 and the EU are always positive and 
statistically significant whereas for the Carins group it is negative and not 
significant. It implies that the Group 10 and the EU have unique features 
compared with the United States whereas the Cairns group does not. It is difficult 
to tell unique features exactly because each country has different agricultural 
conditions. The highly positive coefficients of the Group 10 dummy variables 
statistically significant may show agricultural inefficiency and concerns over 
multifunctionality of agriculture such as food security, environment and rural 
development. The positive coefficients of the EU dummy variables also may 
reveal relatively lower agricultural efficiency and concerns over 
multifunctionality of agriculture such as environment and rural developmentFF
10
FF. 
The Cairns group is statistically the same as the United States. Both the Cairns 
group and the United States are agricultural exporters. The negative coefficients of 
the Cairns group show relatively higher agricultural efficiency. As a result, it can 
be said that each ally has different levels of agricultural protection due to a stance 
on multifunctionality of agriculture and agricultural efficiency.     
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical findings offer several main aspects of agricultural protection in 
industrial countries. The empirical analysis reveals that agricultural protection 
increases when market conditions are against farming industry and in countries 
with a agricultural comparative disadvantage. Therefore, it is clarified that 
international trade theory such as a comparative advantage and international terms 
of trade still works on agricultural protection in industrial countries. Agricultural 
protection increases when a share of agriculture decreases, which provides 
empirical support to the Olsonian logic, so called the paradox of number. 
Agricultural income is also an important determinant of levels of agricultural 
protection, suggesting that agricultural protection is political income redistribution 
to agricultural producers. It is found that the intended goals of Uruguay Round 
                                                                                                                                      
NPCp=(Pp + PO/tonne)/Pb =[(Pp-Pb)+PO/tonne]/Pb +1 
where Pp is producer prices and Pb is border prices of agricultural products. 
9 Green and Amber box supports in the OECD countries amounted to US$259 billion in nominal 
terms in 1996, which was higher than US$221 billion, that of the base period 1986-1988. 
Moreover, the share of Green box that is not subject to reduction commitments under the UR 
agreement on agriculture, increased from 24% to 46% in total Green and Amber box supports. 
More recent data from OECD shows that total transfers to agriculture in these countries amounted 
to US$371 billion in 2003-2005, compared with US$303 billion in 1986-1988.   
10 The EU mainly considers securing necessary food in countries where food is actually 
insufficient as the food security whereas the Group 10 considers self-sufficiency as the food 
security.   7
agreements on agriculture, substantial cuts in levels of agricultural protection, are 
so far without results in industrial countries and each ally has unique features and 
different levels of agricultural protection due to agricultural efficiency and a 
stance on multifunctionality of agriculture such as food security, environment and 
rural development.   
Consequently, it can be concluded that agricultural protection in industrial 
countries is composed of multiple determinants. Both economic and political 
determinants play a vital role in agricultural protection of industrial countries. No 
evidence is found that the UR agreements on agriculture have lowered actual 
levels of agricultural protection. In the WTO agricultural negotiations, an 
industrial country has formed a coalition with countries which have a similar 
stance on multifunctionality of agriculture and similar agricultural conditions.   
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Appendix 
Variable definition and Data sources 
Agricultural comparative advantage (Ca) 
The comparative advantage in agriculture is a labor productivity ratio in this 
paper. The labor productivity ratio is defined as the ratio of labor productivity in 
agriculture to labor productivity in industry, both expressed in real terms. Real 
agricultural labor productivity is defined as agricultural GDP per agricultural 
employment and real industrial labor productivity is defined as industrial GDP per 
industrial employment at 2000 constant prices converted to US dollars using 
purchasing power parity of OECD. Agricultural comparative advantage is 
expressed as index form setting the United States value in 2000 at 100. 
The data of agricultural and industrial GDP are from the homepage of OECD 
(http://www.oecd.org). The data of agricultural and industrial employment are also 
from the homepage of OECD (http://www.oecd.org) with the following exception. 
The data of agricultural employment from 1986 to 1994 for Denmark are from the 
homepage of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The data of agricultural employment from 
1986 to 1997 for Ireland are from the homepage of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The 
data of agricultural employment from 2002 to 2004 for the United Kingdom are 
from the homepage of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The data of agricultural 
employment in 2004 for the United States are from the homepage of ILO 
(http://www.ilo.org). The data of industrial employment from 1986 to 1994 for 
Denmark are from the homepage of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The data of 
industrial employment from 1986 to 1997 for Ireland are from the homepage of 
ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The data of industrial employment from 2002 to 2004 
for the United Kingdom are from the homepage of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The 
data of industrial employment in 2004 for the United States is from the homepage 
of ILO (http://www.ilo.org). The data of industrial employment for Belgium, 
France, Luxemburg, Greece, and Netherlands are from the homepage of Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) except for the data from 1986 to 1991. Those 
data from 1986 to 1991 are extrapolated from the data of economically active 
population on the homepage of ILO (HHhttp://www.ilo.orgHH).  
International terms of trade (Tr) 
The international terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the world unit 
export value index for agricultural products to the world unit export value index 
for industrial goods. The international terms of trade are expressed as an index 
with the value in 2000 set at 100. 23 countries take the same value for each year. 
The world unit export value indexes for agricultural products are from the 
homepage of FAO (www.fao.org). The world unit export value indexes for 
industrial goods are from the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook. 
GDP per capita in agriculture (Gp) 
The GDP per capita in agriculture is defined as the ratio of agricultural GDP to 
agricultural population. The data of agricultural GDP are from the homepage of 
OECD (HHhttp://www.oecd.orgHH). The data of agricultural population are from the 
homepage of FAO (www.fao.org).   
Agriculture’s share in labor force (Ls) 
The agriculture’s share in labor force is defined as the ratio of agricultural   9
employment to labor force. The data of labor force are from the homepage of 
OECD (HHhttp://www.oecd.orgHH).   
Agriculture’s share in GDP (Ga) 
The agriculture’s share in GDP is defined as the ratio of agricultural GDP to 
GDP. The data of GDP are from the homepage of OECD (HHhttp://www.oecd.orgHH).  
Agricultural machinery (Am) 
The agricultural machinery is defined as the ratio of the sum of agricultural 
tractors and harvesters-threshers in use to agricultural employment. Agricultural 
machinery is expressed as index form setting the United States value in 2000 at 
100. The data of both agricultural tractors and harvesters-threshers in use are from 
the homepage of FAO (www.fao.org).   
Arable land (Al) 
The Arable land is defined as the ratio of arable land to agricultural population. 
Arable land is expressed as index form setting the United States value in 2000 at 
100. The data of arable land are from the homepage of FAO (www.fao.org).     
Dummy variables 
The UR dummy variable is specified as zero from 1986 to 1993 and one from 
1994 to 2004. The EU dummy variable is specified as one for the EU 15 
countries; otherwise it is zero. The Group10 dummy variable is specified as one 
for Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland; otherwise it is zero. The Cairns 
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Table 1: Hausman test statistics 











*Reject exogeneity at 5% 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results of OLS 




















































































Notes: ***,**and* indicate significance at the 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results of GLS 
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Table 4: Estimation Results of 2SLS 














































































Notes: ***,**and* indicate significance at the 0.01,0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
ln NACp 
ln Ls 
ln Ga 
ln Gp 
ln Tr 
ln Ca 
ln Al 
ln Am 
0.513 
-3.335 
-3.636 
2.306 
4.623 
4.670 
2.928 
4.039 
0.441 
-3.346 
-3.633 
2.350 
4.605 
4.658 
2.983 
4.270 
0.319 
0.607 
0.619  
0.458 
0.059 
0.333 
1.208 
0.818 
0.006 
-4.796 
-5.378 
1.079 
4.540 
3.723 
0.099 
-0.562 
1.533 
-1.854 
-2.247 
3.257 
4.757 
5.385 
5.595 
5.082 
 